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This article examines the correlations between aspects of J.M. Coetzee’s Disgrace and André 
Brink’s The Rights of Desire. Apart from sharing the historical context, i.e. post-apartheid South 
Africa, the novels display certain thematic parallels. The plot in each novel is initiated by the 
intrusion of passion into the secluded and uneventful life of the protagonist. Both David Lurie 
and Ruben Olivier succumb to it, with far-reaching and unexpected consequences. Taking as his 
title the words of Coetzee’s protagonist who invokes “the rights of desire” to defend his con-
duct, Brink also portrays an elderly man facing the process of ageing and having to re-evaluate 
his actions. 
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Disgrace and The Rights of Desire are signifi cant literary representations of post-
-apartheid South Africa by two leading South African writers. Published a year 
after Disgrace (1999), The Rights of Desire (2000) explicitly alludes to Coetzee’s 
novel by quoting in one of its epigraphs – and its title – the words of David 
Lurie, the protagonist of Disgrace.1 There are noticeable convergences in each 
novel’s depiction of contemporary South Africa. Both protagonists are personally 
affected by the profound social and political alterations that accompany the shift 
in power relations within the country. The declining social status of David Lurie 
and Ruben Olivier corresponds to the diminishing role of the white community, 
while the violence and chaos in their lives are correlated with and usually caused 
directly by the hostilities and anarchy rampant in public life. 
This is not to imply, however, that either novel is fi rst and foremost a veiled 
political commentary. This paper will focus on the protagonists’ process of self-
examination and their subsequent transformation, initiated by their last experi-
ence of erotic passion. Lurie and Olivier face ageing and bodily decline; hence 
1 David Lurie’s assertion before the university committee: “My case rests on the rights of desire 
[…] On the god who makes even the small birds quiver”. J.M. Coetzee, Disgrace, London: Vintage, 
2000, p. 89. Later in the text as D. 




the affairs they have with much younger women bring not only a sense of tempo-
rary rejuvenation but also, by exposing the age gap between the lovers, make the 
protagonists painfully aware of transience and their own irredeemable exclusion 
from the domain of youth. Neither affair is likely to succeed, and neither does. 
Each protagonist is brought up short and forced to look back, examine and re-
evaluate his life. In Disgrace, Lurie refl ects on his attractive lover: “a girl like 
that would not come unencumbered” (D 30). Indeed it may be said with regard 
to both novels that desire itself does not come unencumbered. Each protagonist 
comes up against unforeseen complications and consequences which, especially 
in Coetzee’s novel, go far beyond their private life. In the process of struggling 
with their passions, the protagonists confront their self-delusions as well as have 
to cope with the ethical aspect of their conduct.
Although Brink’s novel does not match the complexity of Disgrace, it shares 
with Coetzee’s work a foregrounding of desire as the force which sets events in 
motion and so initiates the action in the novel. Despite all the signifi cant differ-
ences in the later development of their plots, Disgrace and Rights of Desire ini-
tially show their protagonists in strikingly similar situations. David Lurie, at 52, 
is aware of the fi rst symptoms of ageing, which is plainly manifested in his loss of 
sexual attractiveness. He pursues a career in teaching, fulfi lling his duties well but 
without any sense of commitment. His academic achievements have been only 
moderate, and he has neither ambitions nor great expectations of success. The 
same lack of passion characterises his private life – divorced and living alone, he 
has little need of company. Weekly visits to a prostitute are his solution to what 
he calls “the problem of sex.”2 Thus, the opening of the novel fi nds him neither 
happy nor unhappy, but moderately satisfi ed with the state of equilibrium he has 
achieved, and living a life which is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. 
At this stage the protagonist is convinced of his imperviousness to change: “His 
temperament is not going to change, he is too old for that. His temperament is 
fi xed, set” (D 2).
Older than David, Ruben Olivier in Rights of Desire has had his fi rst death 
scare but shares with Coetzee’s protagonist an attitude of indifference and a lack 
of expectation concerning the future. He neither seeks death nor has any determi-
nation to go on living. Having prematurely lost his job in a library, he continues 
to study books, deluding himself with a semblance of academic research, which, 
however, never materialises into a publication. Despite his family’s appeals to 
follow them out of South Africa he is prepared to stay in his old house, motivated 
mainly by his inertia and unwillingness to change. He lives alone, without much 
need of human company, occasionally fi nding “ways and means”3 to cope with 
“the problem of sex.” He describes his existence as “the long twilight that follows 
happiness and unhappiness, guilt and innocence, with nothing more to hope for, 
2 Deidre Coleman claims that this is a quotation from Thomas Hardy’s Jude the Obscure. In his 
preface to Jude Hardy speaks of the “problem of sex” as “a deadly war waged between fl esh and spirit”, 
D. Coleman, “The Dog-Man”: Race, Sex, Species, and Lineage in Coetzee’s Disgrace, “Twentieth-
-Century Literature” 2009, no. 55.4, p. 600.
3 A. Brink, The Rights of Desire, London 2001, p. 22. later in the text as RD.
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no new surprise, no sudden moon, a landscape of the mind so monotonous as my 
childhood plains of Kalahari, and only the intricate treachery of memory to keep 
one awake at night” (RD 3).
The tedium of both lives is disrupted by an erotic impulse, which overpowers 
the men’s unwillingness to change and involves them in developments over which 
they lose control. However, given the ambiguity of both narratives and their adop-
tion of the protagonists’ perspectives, it appears likely that both protagonists in 
some degree persuade themselves that an external power controls their actions, 
which at least partially and temporarily exempts them from responsibility and 
self-judgement. 
David Lurie astonishes and perplexes the university committee of inquiry by 
invoking the god Eros in defi ance of their expectations of an apology for his 
seduction of a student. Rather than defending himself, he casts himself in a role 
which is both rebellious and conventional:
I was walking through the old college gardens and so, it happened, was the young woman 
in question, Ms Isaacs. Our paths crossed. Words passed between us, and at that moment 
something happened which, not being a poet, I will not try to describe. Suffi ce it to say that 
Eros entered. After that I was not the same. [...] I became a servant of Eros. (D 52) 
Lurie’s account has obvious roots in the literature he is teaching to his unre-
sponsive students. The glimpses of his classes in the novel illustrate his interest 
in Romanticism, the Romantics’ quest for the sublime, Wordsworthian moments 
of vision and their transformative power, Byronic heroes’ defi ance of social and 
moral norms. To maintain his pose, Lurie tries to reconcile the idea of being 
a servant of the divine with the idea of self-determination by claiming that he 
chose to submit to an impulse. Yet this relentless recalcitrance, couched in high-
fl own rhetoric, seems to be a form of private self-defence, a refusal to accept 
the unromantic truth – which his ex-wife bluntly points out to him – that his 
affair with the student was banal, silly and ethically unacceptable. Some of his 
responses to the committee reveal that he prefers to see himself as a victim of the 
contemporary strict agenda of political correctness, additionally reinforced by the 
political situation in his country. 
Yet, as Derek Attridge observes, Lurie’s stand does not seem to be “a princi-
pled challenge to the entire establishment in the name of desire.” It would be more 
appropriate to say that it is “more like a matter of pique, irritation, and hurt pride 
taking him willy-nilly down a road whose destination is obscure.”4 Lurie’s evoca-
tion of the Greek deity as the spiritus movens is an evasive act, which precludes 
any admission of guilt or examination of his conscience. Indeed, his supposed 
submission to Eros is also strongly contrasted with Lurie’s open and scornful re-
jection of any Christian connotations in the declaration required of him: “Frankly, 
what you want from me is not a response but a confession” (D 51). He later adds: 
“Before that secular tribunal I pleaded guilty, a secular plea. That plea should suf-
fi ce. Repentance is neither here nor there. Repentance belongs to another world, 
4 D. Attridge, Age of Bronze, State of Grace: Music and Dogs in Coetzee’s Disgrace, “Novel: 
A Forum on Fiction” 2000, no. 34.1, p. 103.
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to another universe of discourse” (D 58). Reiterating his position in a conversa-
tion with his daughter, Lurie recognises the vanity of his claim that his case “rests 
on the rights of desire. On the god who makes even the small birds quiver” (D 89). 
Whereas there can be no doubt that his confrontation with the committee was to 
some extent a one-sided game, Lurie cannot ignore his daughter’s counterargu-
ments and is forced to tone down his claim to divine sanction. His example of 
a dog’s right to remain true to its nature by following its sexual instincts reveals 
Lurie’s confusion as to his motivation. 
His idea of Eros is primarily derived from Platonic dialogues. However, the 
concept of Eros, as numerous commentators have pointed out,5 is by no means 
consistent in the Republic, the Symposium and the Phaedrus, i.e. the three main 
dialogues in which Socrates expounds on the attributes of this god. In the Re-
public, Eros is associated with madness and presented as the enemy of reason. In 
Book Nine, Socrates claims that “a precise defi nition of a tyrannical man is one 
who, either by birth or habit or both, combines the characteristics of drunkenness, 
lust, and madness. [...] Isn’t this the very reason [...] why the passion for sex has 
for so long been called a tyrant?”6 (R 394). Socrates’ account of the making of 
a tyrant associates desire with madness and constitutes “the fi ercest criticism of 
eros [sic] in Plato’s dialogues”7:
And when the wicked wizards who want to make him a tyrant despair of keeping their 
hold on the young man by other means, they contrive to implant a master passion in him to 
control the idle desires that divide his time between them, like a great winged drone. […] 
The other desires buzz around it, loading it with incense and perfume, fl owers and wine, 
and all the pleasures of a dissolute life, on which they feed and fatten it until at last they 
produce in it the sting of mania. Then the master passion runs wild and takes madness into 
its service; any opinions or desires with a decent reputation and any feelings of shame still 
left are killed or thrown out, until all discipline is swept away, and madness usurps its place 
(R 394).
In other dialogues by Plato Eros retains his associations with madness, but 
madness itself is valorised thanks to its associations with “prophecy, divine and 
poetic inspiration, even recollection.”8 In the Symposium Eros is reinterpreted in 
accordance with the Platonic theory of Ideas. He is supposed to mediate between 
the world of transient shadows and the world of eternal Ideas, between mortals 
and gods, and lead the human being to immortality. A mortal being wishes to reach 
eternity, either physically, by producing offspring, or in the sphere of creative 
activity.9 In fact, Socrates’ account of the infl uence of Eros implies that “Every 
5 See, for example, David N. McNeill, “Human Discourse, Eros, and Madness in Plato’s ‘Repub-
lic’” (2001) or Charles Kahn, “Plato’s Theory of Desire” (1987).
6 Plato, The Republic, 2nd ed. rev. Trans. with an introduction by Desmond Lee, Harmondsworth 
1975, p. 394. Later in the text as R.
7 D.N. McNeill, Human Discourse, Eros, and Madness in Plato’s ‘Republic’, “The Review of 
Metaphysics” 2001, no. 55.2, p. 235.
8 Ibid., p. 241.
9 Socrates in the Symposium: “Those whose creative instinct is physical love have recourse to 
women, and show their love in this way, believing that by begetting children they can secure for them-
selves an immortal and blessed memory hereafter for ever; but there are some whose creative desire is 
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creative human act is motivated by the desire to extend one’s mortal existence”10. 
In the most famous part of the Symposium, Socrates describes the ascent towards 
the realm of perfect Forms: it originates in the love of one beautiful body but leads 
the individual to transcend the limits of his existence, towards the eternal posses-
sion of the beautiful and the good. Carnal desire is only the fi rst step on the way 
upwards.11 Socrates concludes his disquisition with a eulogy for love: “I declare 
that it is the duty of every man to honour love, and I honour and practise the mys-
teries of love in an especial degree myself, and recommend the same to others, 
and I praise the power and valour of love to the best of my ability both now and 
always.”12 
Lurie’s bizarre self-identifi cation as a servant of Eros enables him to conveni-
ently combine elements of the divergent Platonic concepts. He considers himself 
exempt from the norms in the name of which he is being condemned and pun-
ished, scornfully and proudly referring to public opinion as “the community of the 
righteous” (D 42), which is possibly reminiscent of the stern guardians in Plato’s 
Republic.13 He validates what others consider his transgression by assigning to 
his actions a divine approval. According to his account, his affair with the girl 
started on a supernatural impulse, leading to his transformation and even a form 
of transcendence (“I was not the same” [D 52]); in his recollections of the girl he 
appreciates her bodily perfection. His account of the experience bears marks of 
Platonic ideas. 
Yet Lurie’s version misrepresents the truth, and clearly has been constructed 
to substantiate his self-aggrandisement. The story gives no evidence that the rela-
tionship with the girl originated on an impulse, in a moment of divine possession; 
a more commonplace cause is implied: his arrangement with a prostitute having 
come to an end, Lurie was looking for other solutions to “the problem of sex.” Isi-
dore Diala contends that his “drive towards sensuality is an anxious affi rmation of 
life and self-worth.”14 The beginning of his affair shows a commingling of desire, 
rational calculation and a degree of self-deception, as well as an awareness that 
this relationship is both unethical and unnatural. Lurie’s exhortation to the girl 
to perpetuate her beauty by reproduction, cloaked in the words of Shakespeare’s 
sonnet and possibly another echo of the Symposium, falls fl at because the girl 
fails to recognise the quotation or understand its meaning. Again, this scene dem-
onstrates that, far from acting impulsively, Lurie self-consciously tries out banal 
of the soul, and who conceive spiritually, not physically, the progeny which is the nature of the soul to 
conceive and bring forth.” Plato, The Symposium, Trans. W. Hamilton. Harmondsworth 1959, p. 90. 
10 R.A. Northover, Elizabeth Costello as a Socratic Figure, “English in Africa” 2012, no. 39.1, 
p. 47.
11 Cf. C. Kahn, Plato’s Theory of Desire, “The Review of Metaphysics” 1987, no. 41.1, p. 100–101.
12 Plato, Symposium, op. cit., p. 95.
13 Isidore Diala thinks that Lurie’s performance before the committee alludes to critiques of the 
procedures of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa, which were based on an 
“arguable equation of religious rhetoric with the legal and the confl ation of catharsis with contrition.” 
I. Diala, Nadine Gordimer, J.M. Coetzee, and Andre Brink: Guilt, Expiation and the Reconciliation 
Process in Post-Apartheid South Africa, “Journal of Modern Literature“ 2001–2001, no. 25.2, p. 57. 
14 Ibid., p. 58.
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strategies of seduction and speaks in “[s]mooth words, old as seduction itself” 
(D 16). By offering an insight into his mind the narration reveals his insincerity 
and deliberate scheming: 
“From fairest creatures we desire increase,” he says, “that thereby beauty’s rose might 
never die.”
Not a good move. Her smile loses its playful, mobile quality. The pentameter, whose 
cadence once served so well to oil the serpent’s words, now only estranges (D 16).
The image of the serpent, with its biblical connotations, hints at a fusion of 
ancient Greek and Christian discourses, both in Lurie’s mind and in the overall 
pattern of the narrative. Although Lurie claims that “repentance” and related con-
cepts belong to “another universe of discourse” (D 58), the existence of the other 
universe is implied continuously. In Lurie’s conversation with the chairman of 
the committee terms derived from that discourse seem unavoidable. Mathabane 
leaves the ethical aspect of the affair to “[Lurie’s] own conscience,” declaring that 
the secular tribunal has no wish to enquire into what goes on in his soul (D 58). 
It is possible to see Lurie’s appellations to Eros as a re-enactment of the satanic 
sin of pride, and interpret the subsequent part of the narrative as a realisation of 
the predictable consequences of such a sin. Instead of the continual ascent to the 
permanent possession of beauty and goodness which Socrates depicts in the Sym-
posium, the relationship with Melanie marks the beginning of Lurie’s disgrace 
and radical social descent. From a respectable, self-confi dent university profes-
sor he falls to the level of a dog-man. At the end of the story his plunge appears 
complete: he is a humble volunteer in an animal clinic, assisting in the euthanasia 
of unwanted dogs and the disposal of their remains. Estranged from his beloved 
daughter and unable to accept her decision to have the child that she conceived 
when she was gang-raped, he feels that he is becoming extinct, and currently his 
position is no better than that of the unwanted dogs. As was the case during his 
affair with the student, Lurie’s motivation is not entirely rational or explicable, 
and he again seems to be in the grip of forces he cannot fully comprehend. He 
never attempts to ascertain whether the strange compulsion to look after unwant-
ed animals and their corpses constitutes in any sense a match to his earlier erotic 
impulse.
The same jarring co-existence of different discourses may be observed when 
Lurie at last apologises to the girl’s family. He adheres to his version of having 
been struck by a fi re, but his present plight is summed up by Melanie’s father in 
the biblical phrase “how are the mighty fallen” (D 167). The staunchly religious 
Mr Isaacs is inclined to see a Christian divine plan in Lurie’s experience: “the path 
you are on is one that God has ordained for you” (D 174). 
Although at the level of events there is no link between Lurie’s treatment of his 
student and his own daughter’s ordeal, a pattern of crime and punishment insinu-
ates itself, and Lurie, despite his scepticism about metaphysical issues, is the fi rst 
to admit it in the conversation with Mr Isaacs: “As for God, I am not a believer so 
I will have to translate what you call God and God’s wishes into my own terms. In 
my own terms I am being punished for what happened between myself and your 
daughter” (D 172). What he did to Melanie is visited, with a vengeance, on Lucy. 
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Towards the end of the story Lurie conjures up an image of himself as one of the 
damned: “An image comes to him from the Inferno: the great marsh of Styx, with 
souls boiling up in it like mushrooms. Vedi l’anime di color cui vines l’ira. Souls 
overcome with anger, gnawing at each other. A punishment fi tted to the crime” 
(D 209–210). It appears that, given Lurie’s stubborn pride, punishment of the kind 
that can effect an inward moral transformation could reach him only through his 
daughter. 
Whether this obscure and debatable pattern is completed with a form of re-
demption remains inconclusive. Responding to his daughter’s simple admonition 
that he should try to be a good person, he claims to be too old to change (D 216). 
This assertion echoes what he thought about himself at the outset of the story, and 
what eventually proved to be untrue. Now, Lurie performs completely gratuitous 
acts of charity and has acquired the virtues of humility and compassion. The con-
clusion of the book intimates a possibility of salvation (in which Lurie does not 
believe, however) and simultaneously challenges it. Sceptical about the idea of 
his own salvation, at the end of the novel Lurie has the power to save his favourite 
dog from death but declines to use this power while, paradoxically, with the dog in 
his arms he unmistakably embodies the topos of the Good Shepherd. Stressing the 
diffi culty of interpreting this gesture, Gareth Cornwell suggests that “[r]edolent of 
sacrifi ce and self-sacrifi ce, it appears as a religious observance, a ritual prompted 
by a ‘faith’ that David Lurie has himself not yet begun to understand”15). It may 
be argued that, having started with an erotic desire for a beautiful body, Lurie has 
achieved or at least approached a different kind of love, although one must be 
as cautious as the protagonist himself in using this word. His despair, his social 
decline, his growing isolation are signs of his descent but, “in another universe 
of discourse”, he has made moral progress. Ultimately, it remains irresolvable 
whether any supernatural being has interfered in his life but it emerges that he has 
shifted his allegiance from one set of values to another. Accordingly, it might ap-
pear that this deity evolved in parallel to Lurie’s experience: if the protagonist was 
originally moved by Eros (who is to him obviously only a mythological creature), 
then subsequently it is more likely to be the Christian God (in whom he does not 
believe, either). 
The apprehension about personal extinction, the overwhelming sense of chaos 
and the disintegration of the world around which Lurie experiences at the end of 
Disgrace also affect the protagonist of André Brink’s novel from the start of the 
narrative. His failing health makes the prospect of death unnervingly imminent; 
in parallel to his body, his house is disintegrating; his wife is dead, one of his sons 
has left the country and the other is planning to do the same. Like Lurie, he has 
lost his job prematurely and, again like Lurie who ineffectually dabbles in writing 
an opera, he tries to collect material for some obscure project for which he has 
no great inclination: “More and more I was numbed by the futility of it, this ever-
lasting collection of material for articles I’ll never write. An end in itself, a dead 
15 G. Cornwell, Disgraceland: History and the Humanities in Frontier Country, “English in 
Africa” 2003, no. 30.2, p. 56.
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end” (RD 143). Despite his rational mindset, he is quite convinced that his house 
is haunted by the ghost of a woman slave who once lived in it. But the protagonist 
himself lives a ghostly, insubstantial existence in anticipation of death. Since his 
wife’s death he has had “this strange feeling of being disembodied, of having died 
myself, of surviving in limbo. Leftover time to kill” (RD 74). 
Whereas in Disgrace the intrusion of desire into the protagonist’s life brings 
about substantial changes, a similar incident causes a temporary disruption to 
Olivier’s dreary existence without eventually signifi cantly altering his situation. 
From the moment a young woman appeared in his house in reply to his advertise-
ment for a lodger and the protagonist experienced a resurgance of desire, he lives 
in a state of expectation, deeply unbalanced by the possibility of one last relation-
ship, which remains tantalisingly accessible and yet ultimately is out of his reach: 
“I thought, when Tessa moved in, she would rejuvenate me. Old goats and nib-
blesome leaves. Not so” (RD 145). During her fi rst visit, he is taken aback by her 
blunt question, “What do you do for sex?” (RD 22) and tacitly admits that in this 
respect his life is defi cient, or, to use Lurie’s term, he has not solved “the problem 
of sex” at all. Although, with his growing infatuation with Tessa, a solution seems 
to be at hand, the belated and frustrated desire makes him even more aware of 
the vacuity of his present life. Tessa is “the catalyst that drives the book,”16 but 
the protagonist’s time is fi lled with fruitless waiting. At the end of the novel, with 
Tessa gone, and abandoned by his housekeeper – the good spirit of his house, the 
narrator feels even more lonely and disaffected, and intimations of mortality grow 
stronger.
With hindsight it appears that the effect of Tessa’s presence in his life was the 
exact opposite of what he had anticipated. Rather than reviving his youth, she 
involuntarily prepared him to face death. Her disturbing presence, odd conduct, 
blunt questions cause Olivier to re-examine his past. Throughout the narrative, he 
struggles with ghosts – literally and metaphorically. Olivier’s housekeeper claims 
to have regular contact with the ghost of Antje, a seventeenth-century slave girl, 
who submitted to her white master’s “rights of desire” (RD 41) and paid dearly 
for it.17 During Tessa’s stay, Olivier himself encounters the ghost for the fi rst time. 
At the end of the novel, frantically searching for Tessa’s lost ring, he develops 
a habit of descending to the basement of his house, which leads him to discover 
the skeleton of Antje. The reburial is likely to lay the ghost to rest. 
Whether Tessa’s arrival had anything to do with Antje’s spectral presence must 
remain in the domain of supernatural speculation. It is clear, however, that she 
makes Olivier reconnect mentally with his younger self and recollect those now 
dead who shaped his life. He is jolted from the version of his past he has com-
fortably lived with, and forced to admit his guilt, which, as it turns out, consisted 
16 R.J. Davies, Redefi ning the Enemy: The Rights of Desire, André Brink, “The Lancet” 2001, 
April 21, p. 1300.
17 This meaning of “the rights of desire” as a reminder of the relations between masters and slaves 
in the history of South Africa is analysed by Marita Wenzel in her article Re-writing the “Slave Nar-
rative”: Rayda Jacobs’s The Slave Book and André Brink’s The Rights of Desire, “English in Africa” 
2004, no. 1.1, p. 91–103.
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mainly in his indifference, lack of commitment, and selfi sh withdrawal. Olivier’s 
self-absorption “is treated [in the novel] as evasion, a fl ight from community and 
social responsibility.”18 
Despite being non-religious, Olivier has retained a residue of his religious 
upbringing, which is occasionally revealed in the overtones in his thoughts and 
words. His casual remark at the beginning of the narrative, “sooner or later one 
has to pay for one’s sins” (RD 4), acquires substance as in the course of the story 
he modifi es his self-perception, dispels certain self-delusions and perceives the 
extent of his fault. The state of his conscience is disclosed when he momentarily 
passes out in his basement and experiences a sense of being in hell, surrounded 
by demons who have come to torment him (RD 255). A clear realisation of the 
nature of his offence comes to him at the end, after he and Tessa are assaulted 
in the countryside and the girl is nearly gang-raped. Unlike Lucy in Disgrace, 
she escapes this ordeal, but it is thanks to other people, not to Olivier. Like Lu-
cy’s father, although himself attacked and quite helpless at that time, the narrator 
blames himself for his failure to save her. Allowing thoughts to “move unhindered 
through [his] mind,” the protagonist has to accept the stark fact that she screamed 
for help and he did not help. When he is able to open his mind to “the next slow 
wave of thought,” Olivier is inundated by a catalogue of the numerous people in 
his life whose cries for help he chose to ignore and so inadvertently created the 
void in which he is spending his last years: “How many other voices have there 
been shouting for help throughout my life, shouting for me to help? [...] Yet I pre-
fer not to listen, not to respond” (RD 299).19 
The pitiful story of Olivier’s unfulfi lled relationship with Tessa may be regard-
ed as a form of punishment for his futile, meaningless life. If he feels tormented 
by the ghosts of his past, he is also tormented by Tessa’s infuriatingly volatile 
behaviour. She seems to respond to his desire but keeps her distance from him; 
meanwhile, he endures the frustration of seeing a series of her lovers under his 
own roof. His tolerance of her behaviour borders on a madness which brings him 
only pain and a sense of degradation: “her disappearances, her maddening dis-
regard for my feelings, her invasion and manipulation of my life, her ridiculous, 
adolescent naïveté, her arrogance, her bitchiness, her untouchability. There was 
an almost exquisite pain in piling it all up, fl agellating myself, lapidating myself, 
immolating myself” (RD 151). This summing up leads Olivier to acknowledge, in 
contradistinction to the protagonist of Disgrace, that one’s rights of desire involve 
the right of the other to refuse; hence, the most that can be claimed of desire is 
“the right to be frustrated, to be denied” (RD 154). Yet this sober realisation does 
nothing to free him from his obsession. Desire becomes the worst burden of his 
old age. Accordingly, his supposed “rights of desire” become his ongoing “rites of 
desire” (RD, 154), which survive Tessa’s disappearance from his life. 
18 I. Diala, op. cit., p. 61.
19 Both Ursula A. Barnett and Isidore Diala assert that Olivier’s guilt is his refusal to act and to 
assume responsibility, but both blame him also for his political inaction both in times of apartheid and 
now, during the formation of the New South Africa. U.A. Barnett, André Brink. The Rights of Desire, 
“World Literature in Review” 2001, no. 75.3/4, p. 106; I. Diala, op. cit., p. 62.
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Michael Wood calls The Rights of Desire “manifestly an analogue and an-
swer” to Disgrace.20 In fact, analogies fade as the plot of Brink’s novel unfolds, 
or, rather, stumbles along. As Wood puts it, Olivier “lives out to the full, over the 
course of several months, his right to be frustrated.”21 The reader’s anticipation 
of events is frustrated accordingly. Reviewing The Rights of Desire, Ursula A. 
Barnett comments that the theme of the novel is “inaction.”22
In Reading for the Plot Peter Brooks remarks that at the start of a narrative 
there must be “desire” – “often in a state of initial arousal, often having reached 
a state of intensity such that movement must be created, action undertaken, change 
begun.”23 Brooks claims that: 
Narratives both tell of desire – typically present some story of desire – and arouse and 
make use of desire as dynamic of signifi cation. Desire is in this view like Freud’s notion of 
Eros, a force including sexual desire but larger and more polymorphous, which (he writes 
in Beyond the Pleasure Principle) seeks to “combine organic substances into even greater 
unities.”24 
Whereas in Disgrace the intervention of Eros propels the protagonist to act 
and gives the book a strong narrative thrust, in The Rights of Desire a correspond-
ing intrusion produces very little of such an effect. Nevertheless, inwardly the 
recluse is lured “out of the cave into the harsh light of reality.”25 In Brink’s novel, 
as in Coetzee’s, the ageing protagonist is fi nally coerced into a revision of his self-
image and an acknowledgement of his moral fault.
20 M. Wood, Chains of Love. The Rights of Desire by André Brink, “New York Times” June 
17, 2001, http://www.nytimes.com/books/01/06/17/reviews/010617.17woodlt.html (n.p.) [access: 
15.12.2013].
21 Ibid.
22 U.A. Barnett, op. cit., p. 106.
23 P. Brooks, Reading for the Plot: Design and Intention in Narrative, Cambridge–London 
1992, p. 38.
24 Ibid., p. 37. 
25 I. Diala, op. cit., p. 63.
